

NEGLECTED ASPECTS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND FEDERALISM

BEVERLY A. CIGLER

The preponderance of intergovernmental relations, intergovernmental management, and federalism scholarship examines vertical relationships connecting the U.S. national government, the fifty states, and the more than eighty-nine thousand local governments of all types. Money, mandates, preemption, and the relative power of the states and the national government are the key research foci. This chapter, instead, examines interstate relationships, a horizontal dimension of federalism and intergovernmental relations; state-local relations, a vertical dimension; intermunicipal relations, a horizontal dimension taking place within the confines of state-local relations; and the increasing internationalization of states and local governments, another horizontal topic. Relatively neglected research emphases are noted. (See chapter 18, “Historic Relevance Confronting Contemporary Obsolescence? Federalism, Intergovernmental Relations, and Intergovernmental Management,” in this volume for additional commentary.)

The “state of the discipline” and the “state of the practice” often proceed at different paces, emphasizing different activities. Practice can suggest gaps in scholarly research and can help shape an emergent research agenda. The topics reviewed here have research linkages to other disciplines, but the focus is on the public administration literature. A primary objective is to uncover research gaps by highlighting promising conceptualizations, typologies, and refinements to various research traditions that focus on individual governments but also on governance and all sectors.

INTERSTATE RELATIONS

Theorists of horizontal federalism, or, more broadly, interstate relations, approach the topic in much the same way as theorists of vertical federalism or nation-state relations have done. They examine competitive relationships (Dye 1990; Kenyon and Kincaid 1991). States are economic competitors—for federal funds (Berch 1992; McKinnon and Nechyba 1997), higher-income residents, tourists, and new businesses offering high salaries. The competition may be facilitated by the national government’s policies, such as its ability to pick “winners and losers” in awarding grants, economic stimulus funds, and even taxation policies.

On the other hand, state political boundaries often do not coincide with economic, cultural, or other realities, making some level of cooperation essential and even routine. Each state has the same status with the federal government, or what Watts (1999) calls *de jure* symmetry. State officials interact informally and formally with one another without the approval of the national

government in most cases and develop an array of arrangements administered by managers working across state boundaries. These horizontal linkages are examples of cross-jurisdictional collaborative management, so prominent in public administration (see chapter 17, "Collaborative Public Agencies in the Network Era," in this volume; Agranoff and McGuire 2003), that can result in win-win outcomes for efficient and effective service delivery and policy making.

Benefits and costs of interstate cooperation and competition have been studied (Kenyon and Kincaid 1991), but definitive conclusions are unsettled. Competition may offer residents more choice, forcing a state to be more efficient in service provision and improving allocative efficiency (Tiebout 1956). Boehmke and Witmer (2004) found that economic competition leads to policy innovation and expansion. Rom, Peterson, and Scheve (1998) found that state sensitivity to other states' welfare policies motivated a state to examine and then adopt changes. The adoption of innovative health maintenance organization legislation was in part explained by the proportion of contiguous states previously enacting similar legislation (Balla 2001).

Some potential benefits and costs of service provision are enhanced by economies of scale that cannot be realized without cooperation. Competitive federalism through interstate competition can also have negative consequences. The rent-seeking behavior of states in competing for federal resources and industry can lead to unfavorable outcomes (Zimmerman 1994). When states compete for the same end, the outcomes for individual states tend toward zero-sum, although the federal system as a whole may benefit.

Highly competitive interactions among and between the states may spur cooperation when the losing states conclude that collaboration may lead to success. Cooperative efforts can be relatively informal or can create alliances that require new administrative agreements or management structures. An example of a broad-ranging cooperative effort is the ongoing work of the Multi-State Streamlined Sales Tax Commission, which helps states agree on how to tax online purchases. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact is also widely regarded as one of the administrative successes of the response to the Katrina tragedy.

MULTISTATE LEGAL ACTION: NEGLECTED ISSUE

Interstate compacts (U.S. Constitution, article 1, section 10) require congressional consent, but the purpose of the provision was not to inhibit the ability of states to act in concert with one another but to protect the preeminence of the new national government by preventing states' infringement on federal authority or altering the federal balance of power by compact. Only compacts that affect a power delegated to the federal government or that alter the political balance within the federal system require congressional consent today. If a water-basin agreement among states affects the water rights of a nonparty state, it needs congressional approval. A compact that threatens to interfere with federal preemption likely needs congressional approval. Most compacts are in areas in which state authority is clearly preeminent, such as education. Congressional consent, when needed, is generally not burdensome and is usually a resolution since the Constitution does not specify the means or timing of consent. Interstate compacts are used heavily in the regulatory arena and are examples of a cooperative horizontal federalism approach.

COORDINATED INITIATIVES: NEGLECTED ISSUE

Cooperation among and between states includes joint multistate legal action and optional enactment of uniform laws (Florestano 1994; Nice 1984; Bowman 2004), with each type of interstate cooperation involving different levels of engagement. Multistate legal action (Bowman 2004)

may not involve long-term or involved administrative commitment since staff work occurs in the early stages and is handled by the initiating state. The sparse existing work by scholars studying state attorneys general is important (Clayton 1994; Zimmerman 1998; Bolleyer 2006). State attorneys general have worked together to fight the tobacco companies and Wall Street. Through the National Association of Attorneys General, policy guidelines are developed in such areas as consumer protection, civil rights, energy and environmental issues, cyberspace law, Medicaid fraud, health care, Amber Alert, and antitrust. Policies are adopted on those issues, and the association has ties to similar organizations worldwide.

Other interstate cooperative action relates to conformity across states (Nice 1984). By matching its law to that of a peer-established norm, a state is in a cooperative venture but implements its own uniform laws. The nonprofit, unincorporated National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law in the United States works with counterpart international organizations, and also drafts laws to be adopted through voluntary state action.

Increasing in popularity are coordinated initiatives that could also become multistate executive orders and other informal administrative agreements (Bowman 2004). Mediated through the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause (article 4, section 1, in which U.S. states have to respect the "public acts, records, and judicial proceedings" of other states); the Dormant Commerce Clause (inferred from the Commerce Clause, article 1, prohibiting a state from passing legislation that improperly burdens or discriminates against interstate commerce); and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, in which "no state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction protection of the laws," states work together on issues such as the treatment of criminal offenders after incarceration and marriage laws, simply because people and goods travel. Interstate compacts are the most comprehensive since they result from sustained interaction and require the development of administrative management structures and continuing engagement beyond the date of enactment. The compacts are powerful lawmaking tools in that they are basically contracts among and between states entered into through state legislation. Interstate compacts increase the power of the states at the expense of the federal government because, once approved by Congress, they have the full force and supremacy of federal law, although the terms of a compact can be enforced in federal court to prevent states from ignoring their compact responsibilities.

COOPERATIVE HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM: NEGLECTED ISSUE

Heinmiller's (2007) review of a proposed Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact suggests a novel constitutional mechanism for states to bind themselves to common substantive and procedural environmental protection standards, implemented individually with regional resources and enforcement. A compact might involve the joint development by a group of states of common minimum substantive or procedural legal standards to manage a shared resource, water, but leave individual states the flexibility and autonomy to administer the standards under state law. In the context of Great Lakes water management, the states could craft regional minimum standards to govern water withdrawals, while allowing individual states to develop programs tailored to their specific needs and preferences. Discretion is not absolute, due to programmatic reviews and enforcement by peers. However, the regulatory standards, programmatic obligations, and enforcement mechanisms come from the states' obligations to one another, not from a congressional mandate.

The cooperative horizontal federalism approach is a novel way to make policy. Common minimum standards are developed jointly by the states and incorporated into state law and then individually implemented. Individual state efforts are not undermined in a "race to the bottom,"

and flexibility to shape policies best suited to specific needs and preferences in each state is permitted. Federal environmental protection is still needed, but this “third way” is distinct from the traditional state-versus-federal debate. For environmental policy, the model borrows features from traditional environmental federalism, that is, cooperative vertical federalism, and existing interstate water management compacts, or horizontal federalism. The common minimum standards are developed by the collective states, which serve the function typically held by the federal government. The interstate compact mechanism establishes the standards and programmatic enforcement.

The next two sections of the chapter examine state-local relations and intermunicipal relations. The first, a vertical dimension of federalism, is important in its own right but is necessary to understand horizontal intermunicipal relations since local governments are “creatures of the states.”

STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS: NEGLECTED ISSUE

State-local relations are an important and much neglected area of intergovernmental relations that span constitutional, political, and fiscal ties that bind states and localities, as well as the complex interactions among and between them in delivering public goods and services. Cooperative models of federalism are prominent in understanding state-local relations. Constitutionally, local governments are creatures of state government; however, states depend on local governments to provide essential goods and services. This downplays solely command-and-control policy making. State legislators are elected locally, and many enter the legislature after holding positions at the local level. Municipal and county associations are powerful legislative lobbies (Nice 1998; Cigler 1995).

Some of the first states formed as federations of local government, suggesting the controversial notion that local governments are not constitutionally inferior to state government and rejecting the characterization of states as unitary political systems. Local charters provide a legal basis for local control, as does home rule, which increases local autonomy. Recognizing their interdependence, Elazar (1998) regarded states as unions of their civil communities.

Suggesting that less emphasis be placed on any single government, Cigler (1998) argued that it is the system of government that is most important. Less discussion about government and more about governance, and less emphasis on intergovernmental, but more on intersector relations are both essential. She conducted interviews with six state officials in each state who worked primarily on local issues. Trends that affect state-local relations were deciphered and set in the backdrop of enormously complex and intertwined problems related to demographic changes, technological development, economic trends, citizen demands, resource scarcity, and other factors. Twelve principles that guide cooperative state-local relations for the twenty-first century were developed, defining both practice and goals and suggesting research agenda topics (Table 19.1).

Osborne and Gaebler’s book *Reinventing Government* (1992) was the inspiration for “State-Local Relations: A Need for Reinvention?” (Cigler 1993), which suggests a research agenda. Four broad categories of state-local interaction were developed using a typology put forth in Richard Elmore’s policy research (1987). Table 19.2 presents the typology, which is used to organize the discussion that follows. States use one activity or a combination of activities within each category targeted to change the behavior and actions of local governments.

Mandates

Mandates are regulations or court orders. Unfunded legislative mandates are a significant source of friction between the states and local governments, spanning many areas such as the environ-

Table 19.1

Principles Guiding Cooperative State-Local Relations

- A focus on alternatives to monopoly government, such as contracting and public competition
 - Government as facilitator, enabler, information generator and disseminator
 - Holistic approaches to problem solving
 - Regional approaches to service delivery and policy making
 - Community-level service provision
 - Concentrated resources and more individual and governmental self-reliance
 - Balancing of citizen rights and responsibilities
 - Mandate, regulatory, and fiscal flexibility
 - Accountability for performance
 - Citizen engagement
 - Experimentation, risk-taking, innovation
 - A focus on prevention
-

Table 19.2

Typology of State-Local Interactions

- Mandates
 - Inducements
 - Capacity building
 - System changing
-

ment, health, and employee pensions. Court decisions, such as those related to school finance systems or the constitutionality of certain taxes, are important to state-local relations. States are very active in trying to find ways to help local governments comply with mandates. A bundle of legislative procedural options—program monitoring, fiscal notes, sunset and sunrise programs—increase levels of legislative scrutiny for reducing the negative financial effects of mandates for localities and attempt to improve legislative decision making. Another option for dealing with mandates is reimbursement, the legislative provision of funding to pay for new mandates through appropriations, taxes, or fees. Currently, state and local governments appear to be struggling most with mandates for employee health insurance, pension costs, local government procurement, and care of prisoners.

Inducements

Since the mid-1990s, *incentivizing* is the word that has been used to refer to positive inducements that states make to nudge local governments to engage in cooperative behavior. More points are given in grant competitions for local jurisdictions that cooperate with one another. Shared services are promoted, although states also offer financial inducements for mergers and consolidations. Another type of inducement is provision of negotiation and mediation assistance to resolve local disputes.

Capacity Building

This category of state-local interaction (Table 19.2) spans a range of state activities geared toward increasing local governments' abilities in the managerial, technical, financial, and collaborative

skills realms, as well as their political will to make difficult governance decisions. State technical assistance to local governments is capacity building, as is the provision of revenue flexibility. Honadle (1981) defined capacity building as the ability to anticipate and influence change, make informed, intelligent decisions about policy, develop programs to implement policy, attract and absorb resources, manage resources, and evaluate current activities to guide future actions. Simply put, capacity is the ability to do what is needed and wanted, and states play a central role in helping to build local capacity, including building collaborative skills for intermunicipal interactions.

The provision of revenue flexibility to local governments by a state (Nice and Fredericksen 1995) builds local capacity. A local government's fiscal flexibility depends on the appropriateness, variety, and productivity of its revenue sources. Having authority over sources of significant revenue potential results in flexibility to adapt to changing demands for services and new circumstances. If local governments must rely on the extensive use of earmarked sources, flexibility is diminished (Cigler 1993, 1996; Pagano and Johnston 2000). Cigler (1996) reviewed the literature on state-local fiscal options and developed five broad categories that states can draw on to increase the revenue flexibility of their local governments (Table 19.3). The last category consists of system-changing activities. States must also be concerned with newer ways that local governments obtain revenue, through financing tools related to the activities of special authorities and other entities that are entrepreneurial in leveraging public and private funds (Weber 2003).

Home rule usually refers to a state providing structural options for its local government, but it can apply to local finance (Krane 2001), and fiscal flexibility may be more important than structural flexibility. Many states struggle with how to modernize and rationalize taxation and finance powers of the state and its local governments. This means reconsideration of constitutional provisions applying to taxes, property tax limits or abolishment of the property tax, debt limits, the roles of public authorities and special districts in financing, and overhauling nonproperty taxes. This area of state-local relations is among the most contentious since devolution has shifted more responsibilities to local governments, often without increased funding (unfunded mandates) or enhanced ability to raise revenues.

A significant capacity-building activity is state monitoring of fiscal stress, that is, a community's financial condition. Beth Honadle (2003) and Kloha, Weissert, and Kleine (2005a, 2005b) document that the state roles in forecasting, mitigating, and averting local government fiscal crises are expanding. Local governments experience financial difficulty from many sources: declining revenues due to less sales tax, property tax, or intergovernmental revenues; increased liabilities; high levels of debt; problems stemming from salary and fringe benefit costs or public safety; and a variety of operating gaps. In their book, Honadle, Costa, and Cigler (2004) provide an introduction to and applications of widely used measures of fiscal stress.

Still another capacity-building activity is state provision of technical assistance to local governments. Assistance is often combined with inducements to get local governments to change how they work together, use various revenue options, or other perform activities. Many states offer "schools" for newly elected officials through their departments of community affairs, municipal associations, or universities, and some states (e.g., Georgia) mandate training for newly elected officials.

System Changing

The greatest likelihood for reinventing state-local relations may be in restructuring local government, which usually requires state action. Annexation, tax-base sharing, transfer of powers

Table 19.3

Ways That States Increase Local Revenue Flexibility

- Changing the level or pattern of intergovernmental assistance
- Altering local tax options
- Revising property tax laws and administration
- Altering user charges or fees
- Encouraging or mandating a fundamental restructuring of the system of local governance

among governments, and city-county consolidation are examples, as is state or city takeover of the schools. Currently, functional consolidations of a specific service—police, fire, schools, solid waste—are more popular than consolidations of governments in a region. Maryland, Virginia, and other southern states have countywide school districts, and their model has attracted attention from other states. System-changing options often involve intermunicipal relations.

INTERMUNICIPAL RELATIONS

Roscoe Martin (1963) was the first scholar to develop a continuum of the ways to organize services in a metropolitan area or region. His classification system was flexible so that others could incorporate new practices, which was done by David B. Walker (1987, 1995) and Patricia Atkins (1998). Walker highlighted seventeen alternative arrangements, and Atkins provided twenty-five. The classifications begin with options that require none or very little loss of autonomy or intermunicipal interaction, such as the use of informal agreements. The different ways to organize and deliver services mostly involve increased intermunicipal or state-local interactions and a relative loss of autonomy. Examples are formal interlocal agreements, interlocal service contracts, privatization, multicomunity partnerships, regional councils, special-purpose districts, transfers of functions, annexation, tax-base sharing, functional service consolidations, regional authorities, consolidated or merged governments, and metropolitan government. The typologies related to intermunicipal service delivery are useful both for heuristic purposes and for targeting specific options for research study. Indeed, entire bodies of literature now focus on topics such as special districts; privatization, especially contracting out and public-private partnerships; and city-county consolidations.

The theoretical underpinning about the options can be divided into several “schools.” Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren (1961) utilized the field of public goods economic theory (Tiebout 1956), which characterized the pattern of local governments in metropolitan areas as polycentric, and used that interpretation to explain the organization of governments for the delivery of services. They carefully distinguished between the *provision* and the *production* of local services. A local government could provide services to its residents or choose to let residents provide the services themselves. If a service was provided, there were options for its production, including in-house, contracting out to another government or to a private vendor, or the use of volunteers or vouchers (ACIR 1973, 1987).

The polycentric theory of local public economies, at the time of its development, stood in sharp contrast to a model of metropolitan governance that has a metropolitan structure intended to capture economies of scale in service provision. Advocates of consolidating existing jurisdictions claimed that a fragmented governmental system with multiple and overlapping governments was incapable of cooperation to resolve problems that cross jurisdictional boundaries and that competition among and between local governments was a wasteful duplication of services.

Since the 1960s, the polycentric theory, or the “public choice” school, was developed further (Ostrom 1973) and tested by empirical research (e.g., Ostrom, Parks, and Whitaker 1978; ACIR 1987; Ostrom, Bish, and Ostrom 1988). Most research, however, has emphasized the value of efficiency (Bish 1971), to the neglect of equity, effectiveness, accountability, or other values. Much of the early research compared the unit costs of in-house versus contracted production and found private producers to be more efficient than public producers of the same services (Savas 1982, 1987; ACIR 1987). That research, however, focused on a few local services such as solid waste collection.

City-County Consolidations

The research on city-county consolidations is representative of findings on government structure at the end of the Martin (1963), Walker (1987, 1995) and Atkins (1998) classifications—those options that are most difficult to enact and that represent the greatest challenges to local autonomy. Carr and Feiock (2004) and Leland and Thurmaier (2004) provided recent book-length assessments of city-county consolidation. Staley and colleagues (2005) reviewed nearly three dozen recent peer-reviewed studies of city-county consolidations for the Indiana General Assembly. They drew five conclusions: significant gains in efficiency are unlikely; significant gains in perceived service quality are more likely but not ensured; modest changes to city governance, such as some functional consolidations, are unlikely to have a major impact on economic development; morale problems are a major obstacle to consolidation; and context matters, with research results mixed and done on a case-by-case analysis.

Boyd (2008) reviewed city-county merger studies nationwide for a New York commission, and his findings dovetailed with the Indiana study. He considered ways for local jurisdictions to be dissolved or merged and the transfer of functions to counties. In addition to the Indiana study, Boyd located seven other recent academic and nonacademic literature reviews of the topic. Other comparative analyses of consolidations were published by the Pennsylvania Economy League of Southwestern Pennsylvania (2007) and Ball State University’s Center for Business and Economic Research (Faulk and Hicks 2009), which focused on the costs of consolidation. Laura Reese (2004) also provided a thorough review of the metropolitan reorganization literature.

There continues to be some support for the consolidation and simplification of local government structures in urban areas, but that support lies primarily outside of academia—pushed by civic groups and newspapers. Proponents still draw on the progressive reform tradition of the early twentieth century, with its belief in centralizing authority to take power away from old-style political machines. Olberding (2002) notes that nearly 80 percent of city-county consolidation proposals in the United States have been rejected by voters. She also explains that the emphasis on centralized regional governments promoted in the 1960s to enhance efficiencies and maximize economies of scale, sometimes backed by federal funding, also lost popularity during the 1980s. Only a few large city-county consolidations have occurred in the last forty years. Widely studied is the Indianapolis UniGov system, created by the legislature in 1969. Rosentraub’s research on UniGov offers positive and negative lessons learned and is important because UniGov did not eliminate all other local governments. It is basically a multilayered system with five cities, nine townships, eleven school districts, and seven police departments that has attributes of regional cooperation but preserves local control of other basic municipal services (Rosentraub 2000). School district consolidations are still popular for study, but not often implemented (Duncombe and Yinger 2001).

Shared Services: Neglected Issue

The most discussed and evaluated intermunicipal option “in practice” is the sharing of services on a voluntary basis. There are thousands of shared service agreements among local governments across the states, and there is an extensive literature on the topic, mostly produced by state agencies, legislative commissions, and local governments, especially counties and regional organizations. There is less peer-reviewed academic research, although academics have produced reports for government agencies and legislatures. Cigler (2001) conducted baseline research in Pennsylvania on intermunicipal organizations—councils of government—and service delivery.

Other Pennsylvania research is reported in Honadle, Costa, Cigler (2004) from interviews with local officials to ascertain perceived barriers to intermunicipal cooperation, in general, and formal intergovernmental agreements, in particular, including how to overcome those barriers. A lack of information about available options, not unwillingness to change, proved to be a major barrier to change. State government’s role in providing financial incentives and capacity building by developing model agreements, collaborative skills-building training, and other factors was explored, based on information gathered from published reports in forty-three states. Skelly’s (1997) criteria for evaluating the impact of various service-delivery options and Hirsch’s (1991) definitions of options such as intergovernmental agreements were used to examine alternatives on efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, and equity criteria.

Handbooks on alternative service-delivery options, most involving intermunicipal interactions, were developed by Armington and Ellis (1984) and Eggers (1997). Innovative databases and inventories exist on intermunicipal cooperation, such as those at the University of Albany and the Institute for Local Governance and Regional Growth at the University of Buffalo. These are largely untapped by academics for peer-reviewed publications. Before there can be shared services or other intermunicipal cooperation, it is often the case that state laws must be changed, a topic of substantial interest across the states, which generally have outdated municipal classification systems and powers. If counties and municipalities do not have the same functions in a state, for example, cooperation is more difficult (Cigler 1994).

Some states (New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey) have formal shared municipal service incentive grant programs based on competition. In New York, the state’s shared services program uses relatively small amounts of resources to encourage significant amounts of collaborative thinking among small, rural governments, but the funds available are for areas in which sharing is already common. Significant changes do not occur for the more challenging functional areas, as communities are prone to buy things together more than to do things together (New York State Commission on Local Government Efficiency and Competitiveness 2008).

State capacity building to promote intermunicipal cooperation includes reviewing statutes governing cooperation, identifying options, conducting feasibility analyses for interested communities, providing seed funding for collaboration, and helping to negotiate agreements and to maintain completed agreements. Much of the research by “pracademics” has shifted from concentration on and advocacy for one option or another to answering questions about how a given option will work (Warner and Hebdon 2001).

Lamothe, Lamothe, and Feiock (2008) reviewed the literature that draws on the influences of transaction costs, markets, and a limited number of jurisdictional factors to focus primarily on production mechanisms. The jurisdictional factors they consider are management capacity, management structure, and market position. Similarly, Andrew (2009) provided an overview of interjurisdictional agreements and how they operate, as well as their patterns of use, based on recent literature. The literature used for the assessments does not consider some useful findings from case

Figure 19.1 **The Continuum of Multicommunity Collaboration (MC²)**

studies, especially the role of capacity building and provision of information about options. Many recent studies overlook the basic notion that the characteristics of a service dictate, in large part, what types of tools and approaches are most useful for delivering a service and what the outcomes are likely to be in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and accountability (Skelly 1997).

Regional Economic Collaboration: Neglected Issue

Transaction costs theory, collective action, and network theory concepts were used for field research in six rural regions of the United States and one Canadian province. The field study communities were selected using a snowball technique based on national telephone interviews with state and province officials familiar with clusters of communities with long-term collaborations in regional economic development and service delivery. The multidisciplinary research team represented planning, sociology, economics, and public administration. Findings and typologies developed by the public administration member focused on “multicommunity collaboration” (MC²)—alliances among multiple communities and across sectors (Cigler 1992, 1999, 2001). A continuum of types of collaboration among the study communities was developed, ranging from conflict, to networking or communication, cooperation, coordination, to truly collaborative relationships in which actors recognized their “shared destiny” (Figure 19.1). Significantly, the organizations studied had themselves evolved along such a continuum of partnership over many years.

Successful alliances began with partnerships on relatively small projects in less contentious service and policy areas (e.g., arts festivals) and then made slow, steady progress over many years, using measurable results to snowball successes further along the continuum. The findings and continuum have been used and refined by other researchers studying collaboration, including Keast et al. (2004) and Guo and Acar (2005).

Key obstacles to the multicommunity efforts were related to allocation of costs, policy-making structures, conflict resolution, contract specifics and length, project administration, and selection of services. These were circumvented by leadership quality and removal of legal and statutory impediments, real or perceived, on a host of issues: general- versus limited-purpose governments, differing county and municipal authority, collective bargaining, and revenue and financing issues. When parties to an alliance saw mutual benefits and mutual powers, with no transfer of sovereign powers, chances of acceptance increased.

From the case study research a set of nine “preconditions” that help explain the emergence of multicommunity collaborative organizations was developed (Table 19.4). Whether a particular precondition is “necessary and/or sufficient” for complex collaborations to occur was not established; that is, the exploratory comparative case studies were not used to posit a causal theory. Instead, the preconditions highlight aspects of emergent multiorganizational, multisector, and multicommunity collaboration in need of scrutiny before serious theory development can occur. Practical strategies of facilitating partnership formation are also derived from the preconditions, which also suggest categories of research needs for studying intermunicipal collaboration.

Overall, visionary leadership by a local champion, informed capacity building including financial and technical assistance, especially training in collaborative skills development, were especially important to the areas studied.

Table 19.4

Preconditions for Multicommunity Collaboration (MC²)

- A disaster occurrence
- Fiscal stress or perceived stress
- A political constituency for cooperation
- Supportive capacity-building from state government, municipal associations, or foundations
- Early and continued support of local elected officials
- A clear demonstration of advantages
- The presence of a policy entrepreneur
- An early focus on visible, effective strategies
- An emphasis on collaborative skills-building to create win-win solutions

Large-Scale Regional Collaboration: Neglected Issue

The “big options” for rejuvenating metropolitan-area competitiveness in a global economy involve large-scale regional collaboration. Governance today takes place amid ecosystems, watersheds, laborsheds, commutersheds, and other boundary-spanning descriptions. Since twenty-first-century challenges cross jurisdictional boundaries, so must governance systems. Cooperative intergovernmental relations, both interstate and intermunicipal, are but one part of the governance system that must meld public, private, and nonprofit interactions. Cooperative ventures by states can be induced or mandated or encouraged by the national government, as is the case with metropolitan transportation planning and, increasingly, workforce investment policy.

Interstate and intermunicipal relations research provides some insight for understanding current policy challenges. However, research on intergovernmental relations that focuses on governments, which are geography bound without borders that necessarily coincide with either problems or potential solutions, is limited. In the melding of a governance system involving all sectors, in addition, government may be the weak actor, so placing it center stage for analysis may not be as useful as other approaches. A state’s lack of capacity building for its local governments, weak finances, or any number of other factors may explain “government as weak actor,” but the key point here is that studying the entire governance system with all its sectors—public, private, nonprofit—and civil society may be most fruitful for research.

Collective action theory and hypotheses regarding cooperation—among and between individuals, associations, agencies, governments—is proving to be a useful approach to understanding the big challenges in a metropolitan region. Susan Mason (2008) points out that collective action can solve problems that no one individual can solve alone and that the collective action literature describes circumstances that inhibit cooperation, such as transaction costs and the free-rider problem. Collective action theory offers ways to overcome collective action problems to improve cooperation, such as social institutions and self-governing authority. Social institutions are not necessarily governments; instead, they can be neighborhood organizations, nonprofits, economic development organizations, or other entities. Self-governing authority allows organization members to create their own contractual relations, which lowers transaction costs of establishing and monitoring new institutions, reduces the free-rider problems, and fosters communication. Using collective action theory and hypotheses, Mason was able to draw more insights about ways to obtain regional cooperation in employment and training policy. This was because key actors were not in government and the cooperation problems were not confined to the government sector.

The focus in the public administration and political science literature is on horizontally and

vertically linked organizations that centralize regional efforts through coordinated interlocal collaboration (Lowery 2000; Feiock 2004, 2007). The work is grounded in collective action theory and methods that Richard Feiock has coined as “institutional collective action.” His and other institutional-collective-action-oriented studies envision regionalism occurring through voluntary intergovernmental contracts and other agreements and exchanges that achieve collective benefits. This literature is important and growing in volume—too much to be given full consideration here. The positive conclusion is that much of what is being found through research has been known in practice for some time (e.g., Wisconsin Policy Research Institute 2002). Important is that earlier research that did not use the institutional collective action terminology had similar conclusions. Government agencies, legislative commissions, and municipal associations, as well as individual governments, are increasingly receptive to fact-based analysis, comparative reviews of how services are currently delivered, and available options, including financial, technical, and information-based inducements.

Special Purpose Authorities and Megaprojects: Neglected Issue

The power of special authorities (Caro 1975) has been known and viewed by reform advocates in a pejorative way due to being “hidden” or “shadow” governments that may lack accountability and increase local government fragmentation. On the other hand, these entities have grown in importance because they can bypass the constraints faced by municipal governments that lack fiscal, technical, and managerial capacity—and legal authority. Deal making by public officials bypasses the public and highlights a need for scrutiny and accountability, but the resulting large-scale public-private ventures largely shape regional economic development (Fainstein 2001).

Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) explain that the megaprojects are not created and implemented by municipal governments, which provide basic allocational services (Peterson 1981). Instead, the projects are the result of state agencies and regional entities that leverage public and private funds. Special authorities are largely independent in their operations from municipal governments and work across metropolitan areas. An area’s transportation infrastructure, that is, its network of highways, roads, bridges, tunnels, mass transit, airports, seaports, and harbors, as well as its water, wastewater, and solid waste disposal systems are likely run by networks of special authorities that manage and finance them (Graham and Marvin 2001). The specialized networks help to create authorities to finance and manage tourism and entertainment facilities such as sports stadiums and convention centers. These special-purpose entities operate locally and globally, not just with general-purpose governments, but with entire industries—infrastructure, sports, and entertainment.

In the twenty-first century, special authorities are not simply financing and administrative mechanisms. They are powerful political forces that shape the nature of metropolitan areas and regions, and, thus, they shape intermunicipal, state-local, and interstate relations, but also interactions among and between sectors. They challenge scholarship that focuses solely or primarily on governments and highlight the need for injecting more concern about accountability into scholarship on metropolitan areas. Mullin (2009) examined the capacity of special districts for engaging in responsive and collaborative decision making for promoting the sustainable use of water resources. She concluded that specialization was most beneficial for less severe policy problems.

Cigler (2001) put forth a research agenda for studying multiorganizational, multisector, and multicomunity organizations by public administration scholars. It includes topics such as the effects on accountability when government is the “weak sector” within a collaboration; the basis for legitimacy for organizations not possessing traditional government authority; the representa-

tiveness of the new organizations guiding economic development; government's role in the new types of organizations; and questions related to boundary, such as, Who's in charge? and Who does what?

Can there be regional governance through collaboration, not regional government? The most significant work "in practice" is in the area of land-use planning and growth management, topics not generally researched by public administration's intergovernmental scholars. Dale Krane (1993) argued that intergovernmental research needs to be more closely integrated with public policy research. Studying what is occurring within the growth management policy arena can be helpful in understanding intermunicipal and regional collaboration. Around the nation, groups of municipalities and counties, with the capacity-building help of state agencies, are using what can be called regional-cooperative (Staley 1992) models that avoid formal regional agencies, one-size-fits-all orientations, and tampering with local autonomy. Cost sharing, not revenue sharing, is promoted. New sources of revenue, generally some forms of development levies, are tapped. Negotiation, mediation, and arbitration processes are used, rather than cumbersome, more costly judicial remedies. The goal is to achieve sustainability and resiliency for regions. Cooperative agreements are pursued among local governments when a service to be delivered or a policy to be decided merits joint solution. States are strengthening their laws that guide intermunicipal cooperation and are providing more assistance, both financial and technical. Indeed, Frug and Barron (2008) argue that state law that determines what local governments can and cannot do with revenue, land use, schools, and more stifles urban innovation. The academic literature examining structural versus networked approaches to metropolitan areas in terms of their ability to reduce disparities between cities and suburbs and to enhance a region's ability to compete in the global economy supports collaboration (Savitch and Vogel 2000).

The study of the networks for policy making and service delivery in large American metropolitan areas and their edge cities has moved beyond regionalism to examination of megaregions, which will contain two-thirds of the U.S. population by 2050 (Ankner and Meyer 2009). These economic drivers are networks of metropolitan centers, and their surrounding areas are connected by existing environmental, economic, cultural, and infrastructure relationships. Research already suggests that there may be as many as ten U.S. megaregions that cross municipal, state, and even country borders. To understand, explain, and perhaps influence their development, public administration's intergovernmental scholars must go well beyond their current understanding of intermunicipal and interstate relations. Planning on an interjurisdictional level will become more important, with infrastructure planning and financing serving as the skeleton that links jurisdictions and regions. The European Union is the most advanced model of regional governance, and it has attracted the attention of an increasing number of researchers (Kirkham and Cardwell 2006). France, Britain, Germany, and Italy now work together on many fronts, including having the same currency and despite having different cultures, resources, and languages. The European Union model is basically a three-part regional government system: a metropolitan commission to deal with the regional scale, a regional legislature comprised of elected representatives, and a council of mayors and supervisors.

INTERNATIONALIZING FEDERALISM: NEGLECTED ISSUE

States and local governments are engaging in matters formerly considered national. Forty-four U.S. cities, eighteen counties, and sixteen states passed or considered legislation related to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, or CEDAW, signed by President Carter in 1980 but not ratified by the Senate. Some have formally advocated that the

United States ratify CEDAW. Some, most notably San Francisco, integrated CEDAW principles into their operations. Some individuals opposing the Kyoto Protocol, signed by President Clinton, based their arguments on power and process. Using the acronym COMPASS to suggest the importance of place, the Committee to Preserve American Security and Sovereignty (1998) claimed that decisions usually classified as domestic in U.S. law and politics, not foreign, gave power to the president at the expense of Congress, local governments, and private groups.

When President George W. Bush withdrew U.S. support for the Kyoto Protocol, cities such as Seattle and Salt Lake City enacted ordinances targeting to Kyoto utility emissions guidelines. In spring 2005, nine U.S. mayors agreed to their own climate protection program, approved by the U.S. Conference of Mayors and, by fall 2008, 884 mayors who represent more than 81 million people endorsed the program. The mayors pledged to cut greenhouse gas emissions 7 percent below 1990 levels by 2012, which meets the U.S. target in the Kyoto Protocol. The horizontal interaction extends worldwide through the Large Cities Climate Leadership Group, renamed C40, which includes more than thirty-five of the world's largest cities, including some in the United States. These efforts attempt to reduce emissions, promote technological development, spur the adoption of climate regulation by the U.S. Congress, and promote international climate regulatory cooperation. A number of U.S. states cooperate with some Canadian provinces and a number of European countries on "cap and trade" issues (The International Carbon Action Partnership, www.icap.carbonaction.com).

What previously were viewed only as nation-to-nation issues—the Kyoto Protocol, CEDAW, human rights issues, food safety, and toy safety—are increasingly considered to be translocal governance issues as a result of interactions among local and state governments, facilitated by their networks, most notably the state and local associations. Other examples of state and local interactions in the traditionally international realm are initiatives taken to alter the conduct of the Vietnam and Gulf wars as well as the current conflict in Iraq. Conflict in Northern Ireland and the Middle East, nuclear-free zones, divestment or selective purchasing, the sanctuary movement, and efforts to promote nuclear disarmament and to protect against land mines, to end apartheid in South Africa, and to provide restitution for holocaust victims all saw interstate and intermunicipal interactions. States consider divestment against Sudan, often in consultation with other states with measures already enacted (Hobbs 1994; Fry 1998).

There is a growing legal literature on this topic (Resnik 2008). Ahdieh (2008) makes a key point: The dynamic part of subnational, national, and international coordination today is not the national coordination of subnational actors in the service of international needs; instead, state and local governments are increasingly engaged with foreign authorities and international questions. These interactions suggest yet another "third way" in emergent American federalism, a system in which interdependence and overlap foster the potential for recurrent engagement, learning, and coordination. Substates' horizontal coordination leads to international agreements and law.

Conlan, Dudley, and Clark titled their 2004 article "Taking on the World: The International Activities of American State Legislatures." They examined state legislation in 2001–2 and found hundreds of bills focused not just on promoting tourism and trade, but also on globalization, immigration, human rights, and climate control. Policy activists working through networks and organizations link legislators across state boundaries, helping to diffuse policy innovations. Johnson (2005) asserts that subnational governments and their professional associations enter into agreements and interact with one another and their counterparts in other countries in ways that are beyond the control, supervision, or even monitoring of the national government. That includes developing policy agendas that produce resolutions and lobbying either horizontally or vertically. By 2000, for example, twenty-six municipalities and four states had enacted economic

sanction laws aimed at Myanmar (Burma), Nigeria, and other nations (Guay 2000). Borut (1998) provides examples of local governments adopting an international agenda.

SUMMARY

Horizontal dimensions of intergovernmental relations, intergovernmental management, and federalism are examined in this chapter by focusing on interstate and intermunicipal issues. This focuses particular attention on legal relationships among subnational governments in the federal system. Research gaps, such as multistate actions less formal than interstate compacts—joint legal action, coordinated initiatives, and policy making through flexible, collaborative agreements across states—are important areas for future research as states shape nationally relevant policies. How, and in what other ways, are states reshaping our understanding of federalism? Intermunicipal relations are addressed, in part, by using a governance approach to incorporate the roles and interactions of all sectors. What challenges face researchers in designing local governance research? Should traditional notions of dual federalism be reconceptualized, in addition, due to the growing activism by states and local governments in the international arena, guided by cooperation and interdependence?

The areas of state-local relations and intermunicipal relations present opportunities to highlight promising conceptualizations, typologies, and refinement to some long-standing research traditions. Four broad categories of state-local interaction—mandates, inducements, capacity building, and systemic change—frame the discussion. Promising ways to study intermunicipal issues—collective action theory, case study research, and crossing municipal boundaries by studying regional special authorities and megaregions—offer research gaps in understanding rural, metropolitan, and regional economic development in the global context. Especially emphasized is the need to use more case study research to uncover key variables to incorporate into empirical studies.

The literature reviewed shows that academic researchers continue to emphasize topics that the practitioner community has abandoned, for example, structural government consolidation. How can public administration research be more attuned to significant trends in practice? The continuum of types of collaboration and the set of preconditions for the emergence of collaborative organizations offer an expanded research agenda to help answer questions about regional governance through collaborative, not structural, change. The chapter's focus on contemporary and emerging issues of "practice" that currently outpace scholarly research output demonstrate that the state of the practice can help shape future academic research in federalism and intergovernmental relations, areas of fundamental importance to the American system of governance.

REFERENCES

- Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR). 1973. *Substate Regionalism and the Federal System*. Vol. 1, *Regional Decision Making: New Strategies for Substate Districts*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- . 1987. *The Organization of Local Public Economies*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Agranoff, Robert, and Michael McGuire. 2003. *Collaborative Public Management: New Strategies for Local Government*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Ahdieh, Robert B. 2008. Foreign affairs, international law, and the new federalism: Lessons from coordination. *Missouri Law Review* 73: 1185–1245.
- Altshuler, Alan, and David Luberoff. 2003. *Mega-Projects: The Changing Politics of Urban Public Investment*. Washington, DC, and Cambridge, MA: Brookings Institution Press and Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

- Andrew, Simon A. 2009. Recent developments in the study of interjurisdictional agreements: An overview and assessment. *State and Local Government Review* 41 (2): 133–142.
- Ankner, William D., and Michael Meyer. 2009. Investing in megaregion transportation systems: Institutional challenges and opportunities. In *Megaregions: Planning for Global Competitiveness*, ed. Catherine Ross, 166–190. Washington, DC: Island Press.
- Armington, R.Q., and W.D. Ellis, eds. 1984. *This Way Up: The Local Official's Handbook for Privatization and Contracting out*. Chicago: Regnery Gateway.
- Atkins, Patricia S. 1998. Regionalism. In *International Encyclopedia of Public Policy and Administration*. Vol. 4, ed. Jay M. Shafritz, 1935–1943. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Balla, Steven J. 2001. Interstate professional associations and the diffusion of policy innovations. *American Politics Research* 29 (3): 221–245.
- Berch, Neil. 1992. Why do some states play the federal aid game better than others? *American Politics Quarterly* 20 (3): 366–377.
- Boehmke, Frederick J., and Richard Witmer. 2004. Disentangling diffusion: The effects of social learning and economic competition on state policy innovation and expansion. *Political Research Quarterly* 57 (1): 39–51.
- Bish, Robert L. 1971. *The Public Economy of Metropolitan Areas*. Chicago: Markham Publishing.
- Bolleyer, Nicole. 2006. Federal dynamics in Canada, the United States, and Switzerland: How substates' internal organization affects intergovernmental relations. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 36 (4): 471–502.
- Borut, Donald J. 1998. Stepping up to the international agenda. *Nation's Cities Weekly*, January 19.
- Bowman, Ann O'M. 2004. Horizontal federalism: Exploring interstate interactions. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 14 (4): 535–546.
- Boyd, Donald. 2008. Layering of local governments and city-county mergers. A Report to the New York State Commission on Local Government Efficiency and Competitiveness, March 21.
- Caro, Robert A. 1975. *The Power Broker*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Carr, Jared B., and Richard C. Feiock, eds. 2004. *City-County Consolidation and Its Alternatives: Reshaping the Local Government Landscape*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Cigler, Beverly A. 1991. Intermunicipal Organizations. Center for Rural Pennsylvania, a Legislative Agency, Harrisburg, PA.
- . 1992. Pre-conditions for multicommunity collaboration. In *Multicommunity Collaboration: An Evolving Rural Revitalization Strategy*, ed. Peter F. Korsching, Timothy O. Borich, and Julie Stewart, 53–74. Ames, IA: Northwest Central Regional Center for Rural Development.
- . 1993. State-local relations: A need for reinvention? *Intergovernmental Perspective* 19 (1): 15–18.
- . 1994. The county-state connection: A national study of associations of counties. *Public Administration Review* 54 (1): 3–11.
- . 1995. Not just another special interest: The intergovernmental lobby. In *Interest Group Politics*. 4th ed., ed. Allan J. Cigler and Burdett Loomis, 131–153. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- . 1996. Revenue diversification among American counties. In *The American County: Frontiers of Knowledge*, ed. Donald C. Menzel, 166–183. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- . 1998. Emerging trends in state-local relations. In *Governing Partners: State-Local Relations in the U.S.*, ed. Russell L. Hanson, 53–74. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- . 1999. Pre-conditions for the emergence of multicommunity collaborative organizations. *Policy Studies Review* 16 (1): 86–102.
- . 2001. Multiorganization, multisector, and multicommunity organizations: Setting the research agenda. In *Getting Results Through Collaboration: Networks and Network Structures for Public Policy and Management*, ed. Myrna P. Mandell, 71–85. Westport, CT: Quorum Books.
- Clayton, Cornell W. 1994. Law, politics and the new federalism: State attorneys general as national policy-makers. *Review of Politics* 56 (3): 525–553.
- Committee to Preserve American Security and Sovereignty (COMPASS). 1998. Treaties, national sovereignty, and executive power: A report on the Kyoto Protocol. Presented at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Conference: American Sovereignty and Security at Risk, Alexandria, VA, May 18. <http://jamesvdelong.com/articles/environmental/kyoto.html> (accessed September 19, 2009).
- Conlan, Timothy J., Robert L. Dudley, and Joel F. Clark. 2004. Taking on the world: The international activities of American state legislatures. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 34 (3): 183–200.
- Duncombe, William, and John Yinger. 2001. Does school district consolidation cut costs? Working Paper No. 33, Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse, NY.

- Dye, Thomas R. 1990. *American Federalism: Competition among Governments*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
- Eggers, William. 1997. *Performance-Based Contracting: Designing State-of-the-Art Contract Administration and Monitoring Systems*. Los Angeles, CA: Reason Foundation.
- Elazar, Daniel J. 1998. State-local relations: Union and home rule. In *Governing Partners: State-Local Relations in the U.S.*, ed. Russell L. Hanson, 37–52. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Elmore, Richard F. 1987. Instruments and strategy in public policy. *Policy Studies Review* 7 (1): 174–186.
- Fainstein, Susan S. 2001. *The City Builders*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Faulk, Dagney, and Michael Hicks. 2009. *Local Government Reform in Indiana*. Muncie, IN: Center for Business and Economic Research, Miller College of Business, Ball State University.
- Feiock, Richard C. 2004. Introduction: Regionalism and institutional collective action. In *Metropolitan Governance: Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation*, ed. Richard C. Feiock, 8–26. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- . 2007. Rational choice and regional governance. *Journal of Urban Affairs* 29:47–62.
- Florestano, Patricia S. 1994. Past and present utilization of interstate compacts in the United States. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 24 (4): 13–25.
- Frug, Gerald E., and David J. Barron. 2008. *City Bound: How States Stifle Urban Innovation*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Fry, Earl H. 1998. *The Expanding Role of State and Local Governments in U.S. Foreign Affairs*. Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations.
- Graham, Stephen, and Simon Marvin. 2001. *Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructures, Technological Mobilities, and the Urban Condition*. New York: Routledge.
- Guay, Terrence. 2000. Local government and global politics: The implications of Massachusetts' "Burma law." *Political Science Quarterly* 115 (3): 353–376.
- Guo, Chao, and Muhittin Acar. 2005. Understanding collaboration among nonprofit organizations: Combining resource dependency, institutional, and network perspectives. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 34 (3): 340–361.
- Heinmiller, B. Timothy. 2007. Do intergovernmental institutions matter? The case of water diversion regulation in the Great Lakes Basin. *Governance* 20 (4): 655–674.
- Hirsch, Walter Z. 1991. *Privatizing Government Services: An Economic Analysis of Contracting Out by Local Governments*. Monograph and Research Series 54. Los Angeles: Institute of Industry, UCLA.
- Hobbs, Heidi. 1994. *City Hall Goes Abroad: The Foreign Policy of Local Politics*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Honadle, Beth Walter. 1981. A capacity-building framework: A search for concept and purpose. *Public Administration Review* 41 (5): 575–580.
- . 2003. The state's role in U.S. local government fiscal crises: A theoretical model and results of a national survey. *International Journal of Public Administration* 26 (13): 1431–1472.
- Honadle, Beth Walter, James M. Costa, and Beverly A. Cigler. 2004. *Fiscal Health for Local Governments: An Introduction to Concepts, Practical Analysis, and Strategies*. New York: Elsevier.
- Johnson, Bertram. 2005. Associated municipalities: Collective action and the formation of state leagues of cities. *Social Science History* 29:549–558.
- Keast, Robyn, Myrna P. Mandell, Kerry Brown, and Geoffrey Woolcock. 2004. Network structures: Working differently and changing expectations. *Public Administration Review* 64 (3): 363–371.
- Kenyon, Daphne A., and John Kincaid. 1991. Introduction. In *Competition Among States and Local Governments*, ed. Daphne A. Kenyon and John Kincaid, 1–33. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press.
- Kirkham, Richard, and Paul James Cardwell. 2006. *The European Union: A Role Model for Regional Governance?* Aspen, CO: Aspen Publishers.
- Kloha, Philip, Carol Weissert, and Robert Kleine. 2005a. Someone to watch over me: State practices in monitoring local fiscal conditions. *American Review of Public Administration* 35 (3): 236–255.
- . 2005b. Developing and testing a new composite model to predict local fiscal distress. *Public Administration Review* 65 (3): 278–288.
- Krane, Dale. 1993. American federalism, state governments, and public policy: Weaving together loose theoretical threads. *PS: Political Science and Politics* 26 (2): 186–190.
- , ed. 2001. *Home Rule in America*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 356–366.
- Lamothe, Scott, Meeyoung Lamothe, and Richard C. Feiock. 2008. Examining local government service delivery arrangements over time. *Urban Affairs Review* 44 (1): 27–56.

- Leland, Suzanne M., and Kurt Thurmaier, eds. 2004. *Case Studies of City-County Consolidation*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Lowery, David. 2000. A transaction costs model of metropolitan governance: Allocation versus redistribution in urban America. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 10 (1): 49–78.
- Martin, Roscoe C. 1963. *Metropolis in Transition: Local Government Adaptation to Changing Urban Needs*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Housing and Home Finance Agency.
- Mason, Susan G. 2008. Regional cooperation in employment and training policy: A matter of collective action or intergovernmental relations? *Community Development: Journal of the Community Development Society* 39 (4): 1–16.
- McKinnon, Ronald, and Thomas Nechyba. 1997. Competition in federal systems: The role of political and financial constraints. In *The New Federalism: Can the States Be Trusted?* ed. John Ferejohn and Barry R. Weingast, 3–61. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Mullin, Megan. 2009. *Governing the Tap: Special District Governance and the New Local Politics of Water*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- New York State Commission on Local Government Efficiency & Competitiveness (2008). Twenty-first Century Local Government. New York: Albany (April) (www.nyslocalgov.org).
- Nice, David C. 1984. Cooperation and conformity among the states. *Polity* 16 (Spring): 494–505.
- Nice, David C. 1998. The intergovernmental setting of state-local relations. In *Governing Partners: State-Local Relations in the U.S.*, ed. Russell L. Hanson, 17–36. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Nice, David, and Patricia Fredericksen. 1995. Fiscal federalism. In *The Politics of Intergovernmental Relations*. 2d ed., ed. David C. Nice and Patricia Fredericksen, 49–82. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
- Olberding, Julie C. 2002. Foes regionalism beget regionalism? The relationship between norms and regional partnerships for economic development. *Public Administration Review* 62:480–491.
- Osborne, David, and Ted Gaebler. 1992. *Reinventing Government*. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.
- Ostrom, Vincent. 1973. *The Intellectual Crisis in Public Administration*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Ostrom, Vincent, Robert Bish, and Elinor Ostrom. 1988. *Local Government in the United States*. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies.
- Ostrom, Vincent, Robert B. Parks, and Gordon P. Whitaker. 1978. *Patterns of Metropolitan Policy*. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
- Ostrom, Vincent, Charles M. Tiebout, and Robert Warren. 1961. The organization of government in metropolitan areas: A theoretical inquiry. *American Political Science Review* 55:831–842.
- Pagano, Michael, and Jocelyn Johnston. 2000. Life at the bottom of the fiscal food chain: Examining city and county revenue decisions. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 30 (1): 159–170.
- Pennsylvania Economy League of Southwestern Pennsylvania. 2007. A comparative analysis of city/county consolidations. Pittsburgh, PA, February 7. www.alleghenyconference.org/PEL/PDFs/CityCountyConsolidationsComparativeAnalysis.pdf.
- Peterson, Paul E. 1981. *City Limits*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Reese, Laura A. 2004. Same governance, different day: Does metropolitan reorganization make a difference? *Review of Policy Research* 21 (4): 595–611.
- Resnik, Judith. 2008. The internationalism of American federalism: Missouri and Holland, the Earl F. Nelson lecture. *Missouri Law Review* 73 (4): 1105–1147.
- Rom, Mark Caro, Paul E. Peterson, and Kenneth F. Scheve Jr. 1998. Interstate competition and welfare policy. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 28 (3): 17–37.
- Rosentraub, Mark S. 2000. City-county consolidation and the rebuilding of image: The fiscal lessons from Indianapolis's UniGov program. *State and Local Government Review* 85 (2): 180–191.
- Savas, E.S. 1982. *How to Shrink Government: Privatizing the Public Sector*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishing.
- . 1987. *Privatization: The Key to Better Government*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers.
- Savitch, Hank V., and Ronald K. Vogel. 2000. Metropolitan consolidation versus metropolitan governance in Louisville. *State and Local Government Review* 32 (3): 198–212.
- Skelly, M.J. 1997. *Alternative Service Delivery in Canadian Municipalities*. Toronto, Ontario: Intergovernmental Committee on Urban and Regional Research.
- Staley, Sam. 1992. *Bigger Is Not Better—The Virtues of Decentralized Local Government*. Cato Policy Analysis 166. Washington, DC: Cato Institute.

- Staley, Samuel R., Dagny Faulk, Suzanne M. Leland, and D. Eric Schansberg. 2005. The effects of city-county consolidation: A review of the recent academic literature. A report prepared for the Indiana Policy Review Foundation for the Marion County Consolidation Study Commission, Indiana General Assembly, November 16. www.in.gov/legislative/interim/committee/2005/committees/prelim/MCCC02.pdf.
- Tiebout, Charles. 1956. A pure theory of local expenditures. *Journal of Political Economy* 64:416–424.
- Walker, David B. 1987. Snow White and the 17 dwarfs: From metro cooperation to governance. *National Civic Review* 76 (1): 14–28.
- . 1995. *The Rebirth of Federalism*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers.
- Warner, Mildred, and Robert Hebdon. 2001. Local government restructuring: Privatization and its alternatives. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 20 (2): 315–336.
- Watts, Ronald L. 1999. The theoretical and practical implications of asymmetrical federalism. In *Accommodating Diversity: Asymmetry in Federal States*, ed. Robert Agranoff. Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
- Weber, Rachel. 2003. Equity and entrepreneurialism: The impact of tax increment financing on school finance. *Urban Affairs Review* 38 (5): 619–644.
- Wisconsin Policy Research Institute. 2002. *Cooperation, Not Consolidation: The Answer for Milwaukee Governance*. Wisconsin Policy Research Institute Report. Vol. 15 (8). Thiensville: Wisconsin Policy Research Institute.
- Zimmerman, Joseph F. 1994. Introduction: Dimensions of interstate relations. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 24 (4): 1–11.
- . 1998. Interstate cooperation: The roles of the state attorneys general. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 28 (1): 71–89.